Conventional wisdom has taken a beating in this election cycle. And not just the long view stuff, such as the canard that said Hillary Clinton would have this whole thing wrapped up by the end of January. Dozens of short term rewrites have also been hauled to the paper shredder. How many front-runners have the Republicans had in the last twelve months? Have not each of the GOP contenders spent a little bit of time at the top?
Once, little more than 90 days ago, there was a belief—widespread and deeply held—that Senator Hillary Clinton would steamroll her way through Iowa and New Hampshire, obliterating all second tier contenders in a short four or five day sprint, then, in South Carolina and Nevada, she would knock out anyone who remained standing—presumably John Edwards and Barack Obama.
And Super Tuesday was designed merely to make the rest easy: a big, comfortable stroll through 20 mostly Hillary-friendly states all in one day of voting. Game over. Then Senator Clinton could begin preparing for the convention in Denver and sandbagging for the general election fight with the GOP.
In short, Hillary Clinton’s game plan all along more closely resembled the typical Republican template: a short, bloodless skirmish in the early states to validate the front-runner, followed by a long, boring run-up to the coronation in the summer. How has that worked out for Clinton? Not too well.
Instead, Clinton’s 18 months of more-or-less continuous campaigning and record-breaking millions spent has wrought this: a staggering, unforeseen loss in Iowa; a narrow, skin-of-her-teeth victory in New Hampshire; a straight up draw in Nevada; a loss of delegate strength in Florida; and now, coming out of Super Tuesday, a precarious, virtual tie with her closest rival, Barack Obama.
So now, in what has to be the biggest surprise in this year of surprises, all those states after Super Tuesday actually matter. The next set of contests is on Super Saturday, a cluster of five states including Louisiana, Nebraska, Kansas, Washington and Maine all voting the weekend of February 9-10. The numbers in these states do not favor Clinton; she has been losing substantial ground to Obama in the polls in all five. Then, after Super Saturday, comes the Potomac Primary, which includes Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia, all important states for the Clinton operation for not just their heavier delegate count, but for their diversity among Democrats as well. Obama and Clinton may well split some of these upcoming states, with proportional delegate distribution extending the neck-and-neck race well into the next four to six weeks.
Such a prolonged campaign is costly in the extreme, and few presidential candidates in the last 20 years have budgeted for this sort of protracted battle of endurance.
Indeed, the longer this race goes on, the worse it gets for Hillary Clinton. With nearly all of her early campaign money spent, many of Clinton’s paid staffers must now work as volunteers for the foreseeable future, at least until there is another big injection of cash. How’s Obama’s money doing? Early estimates show that in January alone he raised around $30 million (possibly more when the final numbers are officially reported), the largest one-month haul of political contributions for a single candidate in U.S. history. And, according to his campaign, most of that money came from small donors, not the top-of-the-limit $2300 givers that have already been tapped by the Clintons. Senator Clinton will need to find new sources of money to keep her campaign moving forward, and she will need this cash soon if she is going to sustain an ad campaign. Meanwhile, Obama can surf on a combination of voter momentum and swelling support among people willing to donate $20, $50 or $100.
The biggest challenge for Clinton may be stopping Obama’s surge, which could continue unchecked if the Clinton team cannot find a message that resonates beyond her claims of experience and readiness.
So what result did Super Duper Tuesday net for the Democrats? Hillary Clinton won some of the biggest states—California, New York, New Jersey, Missouri, Massachusetts—giving her justifiable bragging rights for her ability to capture the big ticket prizes needed for any Democrat to win in November and leaving only one mega state for Obama: Illinois. Clinton also made deep penetrations into the southern states of Tennessee and her old stomping ground of Arkansas. In fact, her victories in New York and Arkansas were almost complete county-by-county sweeps. Her win in California was important since it broke some of Obama’s growing west coast momentum, but she lost in large chunks of affluent northern California.
Predictably, Obama won in his home state of Illinois—a big prize—but he also carried large swaths of the south through Alabama and Georgia, along the way sweeping up varied demographic segments just as he did in South Carolina and even surpassing his South Carolina white vote percentages in Georgia. And Obama’s surging popularity in the Plains and Western states continues to crest, giving him impressive sweeps of Kansas, North Dakota, Colorado, Idaho and most of Utah, all once considered solid Clinton states.
Obama also won big in some of the key cities: Atlanta, Birmingham (where he took Jefferson County by 72% to Clinton’s 27%), Montgomery (an eye-popping 74% to 25%), St. Louis, Memphis (he won Shelby County by 70% to Clinton’s 29%), Nashville (he won Davidson County by 59% to Clinton’s 38%), Oklahoma City, Kansas City, Minneapolis (where he won Hennepin County by a staggering 71%), Boston and Denver, diverse urban areas that will pay off in November, especially if turnout among Democrats remains high.
At the end of the day Clinton and Obama each got a fair share of trophies for their work. Clinton walked away with the biggest states; Obama walked away with more states and more counties, and possibly more total votes once the results from New Mexico and some Minnesota counties are finally known. (Obama held a razor thin lead of less than 200 votes 48 hours after the polls had closed in New Mexico.)
On her safest turf of New York, New Jersey and Arkansas, Hillary Clinton won big with solid margins (New York: 57% to Obama’s 40%; New Jersey: 54% to Obama’s 44), but in some of Obama’s states his winning margins were blowouts (Georgia: 66% to Clinton’s 31%; Kansas: 74% to Clinton’s 26%). And his wins in some the Western states of Alaska, Idaho and Colorado were even more lopsided, another ominous warning flag for the Clinton campaign as they seek to blunt Obama’s surge. Examples: Obama won Minnesota 67% to 32%; he won North Dakota 61% to Clinton’s 37%.
Here are some of Super Tuesday’s highlights:
In New York, as expected, Hillary Clinton made it a nearly clean sweep, winning every county but one. This was important for her in order to solidify her strongest suit, which is that she can carry the big states, thus giving Democrats a distinct advantage—or at least in the current fashionable view of the electoral map—over the Republicans in November. She carried even those counties that had looked like they might be close, opening up larger margins than expected, and she won in the urban areas as well as in rural and upstate New York. Obama won only in Tompkins County and the city of Ithaca, a college town and home to Ithaca College and Cornell University.
Clinton won most of the Empire State counties by wide margins. In New York City and environs, she swept by lopsided differences, taking Queens County and the Bronx by 60% each; Nassau and Suffolk Counties by 62%; and Staten Island by 61%. It was closer in Manhattan (54% to Obama’s 44) and in Brooklyn (50% to Obama’s 48%), and in Westchester, where she won by 53%.
But other than a few isolated exceptions, such as the college towns in the western part of the state, Clinton carried most New York counties by hefty margins, some 70% and above, including the upstate counties of Oswego, Jefferson, Saint Lawrence and Franklin. She won Seneca and Cayuga Counties by nearly 72%.
Obama won heavily in his home state of Illinois, but it was not the clean sweep that Clinton received on her New York turf. Obama took almost all of the state, but lost a chunk in south Illinois, giving Clinton a foothold in the rural and primarily agricultural counties of Perry, Franklin, Hamilton, Saline and six other southern counties. But even there, her wins were close—in some cases razor close, allowing Obama to take the lion’s share of the Illinois delegate count. Viewed generally, Obama’s margin was larger the farther north you look across the state. In the cluster of counties around his base of Chicago, he won by margins ranging from as low as 60% (Will County) to as high as 69% in Chicago’s Cook County. Obama carried Lake County by 62%, Kane County (Aurora) by 63% and likewise Winnebago (Rockford) by 63%. In Springfield and Sangamon County, the state capital and the site of the start of Obama’s candidacy, he swept to victory by over 72%.
In Alabama Obama took virtually all of the state from Birmingham south to the Gulf of Mexico, leaving Clinton with a chunk of counties in the north of the state from Jefferson County up to the Tennessee line. Obama’s win in Mobile County was substantial: he took over 65% out of the nearly 42,000 total votes cast. Along the eastern edge of the state, where the counties slope gently toward the valley of the Chattahoochee River and the border with Georgia, Obama swept by large numbers, taking Chambers County by 61%, Lee County by 64%, Russell County and Barbour Counties by 63%, and Henry County by 60%. Obama won in Houston County and the city of Dothan by a more modest 56% to Clinton’s 42%. But move into the interior just to the west of those counties, where the African American vote makes up a larger share of the totals, and his margin became crushing, winning Bullock County by 80%, and taking Macon County—east of Montgomery—by 83%, where out of over 5700 votes cast Clinton harvested only 929.
But by contrast, Clinton has her share of big margins in Alabama, especially in the north along the borders with Tennessee and northwest Georgia. In Cherokee County, she won by 76%; in Cleburne County, 73%; and DeKalb County by 78%. In Jackson County, in the northeast corner of Alabama, Clinton won by a whopping 80% to Obama’s 16%. And in Blount County northeast of Birmingham, Clinton’s took 79% of the vote to Obama’s 18%.
California was one of the biggest prizes of the day. For Clinton, it was a chance to again demonstrate her ability to win in the mega states—the same states necessary for a candidate win in November. For Obama, it was another opportunity to show that the momentum is not flowing by default to Clinton. Though she carried the state, Obama also took larges chunks of California for himself, dividing the spoils and reducing her bragging rights.
Clinton won in the Los Angeles megalopolis, taking LA County by 55% to Obama’s 42%; Ventura County by 54%; Orange County by 56% to Obama’s 38% and John Edwards’ 5%; San Bernardino County by 59% to Obama’s 35 and Edwards’ 5%; and Riverside County by 59% to Obama’s 34%. Clinton also carried San Diego County by about 50% to Obama’s 44%, closer, but still a big win for Clinton in the game of proportional math. But in the counties slightly north of Los Angeles Obama did better, carrying Santa Barbara by 51% to Clinton’s 42% and Edwards 5%; and winning in San Luis Obispo at 50% (and where John Edwards pulled in 7%, one of his better percentages in the southern part of the state).
Though he had no big numbers in California, John Edwards made his best dent in the mid sections of the state: he managed to scratch out 12% in Modoc County; 11% in Shasta and Trinity Counties; and 11% in Sierra. In fact, the further from the major urban centers you look, the better Edwards’ take, though this numerical paradox cost him dearly. In many of the farming and working class counties, the population is thin, and turnout was relatively low when compared to the high turnout of the cities. One of the age old political maxims: campaign where the people are.
Obama carried many of the affluent counties in northern California and along the Pacific Coast, winning a nearly unbroken chain from Humboldt County in the north down to San Francisco and Oakland. Obama won Mendocino, Sonoma and Marin Counties by respectable margins, and he also won Alameda by 52% and Santa Cruz by 55%, where Edwards had his poorest showing with low single digits numbers. (Edwards won less than 2% in San Francisco, where Obama won 52%). Though Obama had campaigned in San Jose and spent considerable money on TV airtime, Clinton won, carrying the county by 54% and raking in another 138,000 votes.
Clinton won big in Fresno and San Benito Counties, carrying San Benito by an impressive 61%. And spurred on in part by a large Latino turnout, she won in Imperial County, along the border with Mexico, by an astounding 67% to Obama’s mere 28%.
The total math for California: Clinton, 2,306,361 votes; Obama, 1,890,026; John Edwards, 179,109.
Missouri became an extreme and even clearer example of what some analysts are seeing as a growing divide between rural, working class Democrats and their upscale, suburban and urban counterparts. Though Clinton won heavily in Greene County (which includes the city of Springfield), Obama won by lopsided margins—especially where the African-American turnout was large. He won in Jackson County (Kansas City) by 56% to Clinton’s 43% (Edwards took only about 1% of the vote), and Obama won in St. Louis County by 63%, and St. Louis City—which is separate from the county—by a staggering 71% to Clinton’s 28%, and in the process raking in over one of his biggest urban wins of the day in combined St. Louis with over 164,000 votes. Combined with his lopsided wins in four other Missouri Counties (Boone, Jackson, Nodaway and Cole), his Missouri take was impressive compared even against Clinton’s complete sweep of the remaining—mostly rural—counties in the state. The result was a strangely polarized map of Missouri, with Obama winning the state almost entirely on the merits of his penetration in the cities and suburbs, and Clinton taking the lion’s share of the rest of the state based on her success with the working class and small town vote. In the end, with less than a 1% difference between their totals, Clinton and Obama will split the state’s delegates in half. Edwards won no counties in Missouri and managed to pull in only 2% statewide, another indication—especially in the big states and swing states—that the Democratic race is moving swiftly toward a two-person battle.
Minnesota was clearly Obama country and a state that gave him additional bragging rights in the Midwest and Great Lakes region. But, like other states, the contrast between the younger and upscale Democrats and the rural, financially strained Democrats becomes cause for concern.
A reliably Democratic state in general elections, Minnesota had high turnout in their primaries statewide. Clinton won in about 15 counties total, but her take was blunted by the fact that many of these rural counties have extremely low populations. Obama won heavily statewide, but he also won where it counted most—where the people are, as the expression goes. He won in St. Louis County, which includes the city of Duluth, by over 63%. He won in Olmsted County, home to Rochester, by 66%; in Ramsey County, home to the capital city of St. Paul, by 69% compared to Clinton’s 30%. His biggest score in Minnesota came in Minneapolis (Hennepin County) where he won by 71% to Clinton’s meager 28%. In neither Minneapolis nor St. Paul did Edwards score even one percent of the vote.
Obama’s win in many Minnesota Counties was substantial. In Cook County, in the upper northeast of the state, Obama won by a shattering 75%. He won in Lake of the Woods, which notches up into Canada in the north central crown, by 66%. Obama won Winona in the southeast by 71%. Interestingly, in at least three counties with small populations—Pine, Todd and Marshall—Obama and Clinton managed an exact tie.
Overall, Obama took slightly more than 66% to Clinton’s 32%. Obama netted over 141,000 votes total. Statewide, John Edwards netted only about 980 votes.
Obama also won handily in Georgia, where is racked up a lopsided 67% to Clinton’s 31% and John Edwards 2%, a surprisingly poor showing for Edwards.
With so many African-American voters moving into Obama’s column, the Illinois Senator was able to open up wide margins in many Georgia counties, both rural and urban.
Obama’s take in the greater Atlanta area was vast. In Fulton County, the largest of the Atlanta metro counties, Obama won by 75%, compared to Clinton’s 24% and Edwards’ 1%. In DeKalb County, Obama won by 76%; in Cobb County, by 69%; in Douglas County by 73%; and in the densely populated suburban Gwinnett County, he won by 68%, pulling in large numbers of white voters in the process. South of Atlanta, in Clayton County, he prevailed by a staggering 82%, one of his most lopsided county victories of the day. And he won in Rockdale County by 75%.
When added together, Barack Obama’s vote numbers from eight Atlanta counties approaches 400,000, giving him another home run in terms of total popular votes cast, and making Atlanta one of the large urban clusters that created numerical superiority for the Illinois Senator.
Elsewhere in Georgia, Obama prevailed across large swaths of the state. Obama carried the cities of Savannah (where he won with over 26,000 votes to Clinton’s 9000), Columbus, Macon and Augusta by wide margins. In Augusta’s Richmond County he won by a commanding 76%and picking up over 20,000 votes.
The overall map of Georgia was divided sharply, with Obama carrying virtually all of the state from Atlanta down to Florida, and Clinton sweeping solidly across northern Georgia. In fact, Obama won none of the upper crown of the state. Looking at the county-by-county numbers, the closer you get to Tennessee, the wider Clinton’s margin of victory. In some of these north Georgia areas her margin became substantial, such as Murray County, where she won by a lopsided 81%.
Clinton also won a pocket of southeast Georgia—a cluster of eight counties in the primarily white and conservative areas west of Savannah and north of the St. Mary’s River, though the relatively small populations in these towns and rural areas did not give her much of a numerical advantage when compared to the rest of the state.
The other really big prize for Hillary Clinton was Massachusetts, with its beefy electoral vote value and 93 delegates selected directly by the primary results—along with another 28 super delegates.
Though it was not a complete surprise that Clinton won, there were plenty of political observers who felt that Obama had more than a fighting chance to steal some of Clinton’s thunder in Massachusetts. In the end Clinton carried the state easily, but Obama still managed to grab a solid lead in the most densely populated areas in and around Boston, carrying Suffolk County with 50% of the vote compared to Clinton’s 48% and Edwards’ 1%. (Edwards had a negligible impact in Massachusetts, echoing the general rule that southerners rarely perform well in New England states). The result was close enough in Boston to deny Obama outright bragging rights, but it still served to bolster his overall vote totals for the night, adding to his edge in his popular vote momentum and chalking up another large urban victory.
Obama won in four additional counties, including Franklin and Hampshire Counties in the western part of the state, and the affluent island counties of Dukes (Martha’s Vineyard) and Nantucket, both of which he won by comfortable margins. Obama won in Nantucket by a hefty 60% to Clinton’s 38 and Edwards 2%, though the total number of votes cast in the Democratic primary was only about 2300.
Obama also scored big in the Colorado caucuses. By the time the votes were counted in all county caucuses, Obama had grabbed 79,344 state delegate votes, nearly twice Clinton’s total. Obama will end up with 36 delegates to Clinton’s 19. Obama did best in some of the western counties, where he racked up lopsided victories. Examples: Obama won Garfield County by 72%; Gunnison County by 71%; and Hinsdale by 77%. In Ouray he won by 81% and in San Miguel he won by a staggering 86%, pulling in 333 votes compared to Clinton’s 52.
Obama won Denver by a whopping 69% to Clinton’s 30%, and delivering over 17,000 votes onto Obama’s popular vote trophy shelf. Obama also scored well in the suburban Denver counties of Jefferson, Douglas and Arapahoe, pulling in totals in the 60% range. In Boulder County alone Obama pulled in 74%, burying Clinton by a margin of nearly 3-to-1. Obama also won in Larimer County north of Denver, carrying 72% of the total caucus participants.
But where Clinton won, she won big as well. Her strongest region was in the eastern part of Colorado, and she won easily in Kit Carson, Cheyenne, Logan and another eleven counties, though the turnout was low in these sparsely populated areas. Pueblo County was the only high-density area that went for Clinton, and she won in by a comfortable 57%.
Tennessee may become typical of the pattern forming in the way Democrats are dividing between Obama and Clinton. The statewide vote totals show a comfortable but not overwhelming Clinton victory of 54% to Obama’s 41% and Edwards’ 4%. But real distinctions can be made by looking at the way the rural counties voted versus the cities and suburbs.
A look at the county map and you see a sweeping victory for Hillary Clinton. But take a closer look at the urban counties, and you see a significant win for Obama where the population translates most effectively into delegate gains. In three of the four largest population centers, Obama scored major victories, taking Memphis (Shelby County) by 70%; Chattanooga (Hamilton County) by 53%, and Nashville (Davidson County) by 59%. Obama also won in Williamson County to the south of Nashville, as well as in several neighboring counties east of Memphis.
But aside from these islands of success for Obama, Tennessee was very clearly Hillary County. Some of Clinton’s wins in rural and blue-collar counties were substantial enough as to qualify as mini-landslides. Along the northern rim of the state, bordering Kentucky, where most Democrats are white and far more conservative than the cities, Clinton’s margins were massive. Examples: Stewart County, 78% (Edwards pulled in 9%); Robertson, 70%; Sumner, 66%; Macon, 76% (Edwards performed moderately well here with 13%); Fentress, 82%; and a staggering 84% and higher in Clay, Scott, Campbell and Claiborne Counties along the border with Kentucky.
John Edwards made some marginal penetrations in the Volunteer State, and statewide his total was about 4%, with his best scores in the six to eight percent range and the notable exception of Marshall County—his best result in the state—where he scored 27%.
On the whole, the pattern that formed in Tennessee serves as a template for many other areas of the country: Obama draws African-Americans, the college educated, the economically upscale, and progressive suburban whites. Clinton pulls in the rural voters, blue collar whites, older voters—especially over 55—party regulars (those who frequently vote in primaries) and those with more conservative social or foreign policy positions.
When the dust settles and the delegates are distributed according to the complex proportional math, Obama will pull alongside Clinton to establish a virtual tie in the delegate count. Once alongside, he needs only modest wins on Super Saturday and again in the Potomac states to open up a lead. If he scores big—especially in the February 12 primaries in Virginia, Maryland and D.C.—he could easily give himself a comfortable lead.
Underlying the crisis for the Clinton campaign is the reality that slowly—but with great effectiveness—Obama is slicing away at her base demographics. With each new primary or caucus, the old assumptions fall away, such as the canon that says traditional Democratic segments will “return” to the front runner (or at least to the person most representative of the center of the party) as the primary season wears on. In fact, just the opposite has happened. Once thought to be a creature of young voters and independents, Obama continues to make ever-deeper penetrations into white suburbia and exurbia, African-Americans, working class Democrats, union members, and even women over 55, once Clinton’s strongest base of support.
Clinton loyalists and spokespersons remain optimistic, citing that Obama’s wins have been mostly in small states and caucus states, not the red meat primaries still ahead. Clinton’s trophy shelf, they point out, includes that states that will make the biggest difference for Democrats in a general election. And there is a feeling among some that eventually Obama will stumble, perhaps in one of the upcoming debates, thus scratching or scuffing away some of his Teflon. Hillary Clinton feels most comfortable when sparring directly with the Illinois Senator, and her obvious mastery of Washington detail, policy formation and governmental flow give her the upper hand when it comes to looking prepared and presidential.
But the flip side of this view is that Obama—once tentative and uneasy with the debate format—seems to have found his confidence in these televised exchanges. As long as he retains his footing, the debates may only serve to generate more attention for him, drawing some voters away from Clinton. Besides, Obama shrugs off the comparisons between himself and Clinton the policy wonk, happy to make the contrast that he is “not about the business of Washington as usual.” He does not pretend to be a master of every detail, and he makes the point often that as a good manager he will surround himself with the kind of people who can track and manage the constant flow of legislative and policy minutiae. He has used the micro-management example of Jimmy Carter’s presidency a few times in interviews and debates, suggesting that it will not become his priority to manage things like the White House tennis court schedule.
But all of this will be for the voters in the upcoming primary and caucus states to decide. The cost for both candidates will escalate as this process drags on through February and potentially into March, but there is good news for many voters—especially Democrats.
Imagine a world in which Demo-cratic voters in places like Louisiana, Kansas, Hawaii, Maryland, and Maine actually get to participate in the choice of their party nominee. You mean there is life after Super Tuesday?
Conventional wisdom takes another thrashing when one looks at the GOP results.
Indeed, whereas the battle continues for the Democrats, the Republicans may be marching closer to a surprise conclusion. The net result appears to be that John McCain has solidified his status as front runner, a truly remarkable development for the GOP, and for McCain specifically—a candidate whose political obituary had already been written and published far and wide.
Mitt Romney won easily on his safest turf, but it was not enough to catapult his candidacy back to the top, and after such a large investment of his own cash—$40 million or more, by some estimates—his rewards are getting mighty slim. And Mike Huckabee, the social and evangelical conservative, also won wide swaths of counties in numerous states, still another indication of the divisions among Republican voters.
Mitt Romney has precious little time to turn this thing around. Despite the millions more he may be willing to spend, and despite his obvious attraction to many traditional conservatives, his ability to turn his cash into votes has met—at best—with mixed results. Once the polling leader in dozens of states, Romney’s thunder has been stolen in large part by McCain and the Arizonan’s victories in New Hampshire and South Carolina, and by the persistence of Mike Huckabee. Huckabee has become McCain’s most valuable unintentional ally, siphoning votes from large chunks of the much of the conservative base that Romney had been counting as his own. Romney’s early blueprints showed him winning in Iowa, catapulting that momentum into New Hampshire, and then—comfortably atop the pack—channeling GOP energy into his column through Michigan, South Carolina and Florida. Like Hillary Clinton’s blueprint, Super Tuesday was meant simply settle the issue—if needed—once and for all, a big 20-state mopping up of loose ends.
Now, by most accounts, Romney sits uncomfortably in second place. Still, even as he faces the prospect of raising additional money and spending millions more of his own cash to sustain his candidacy, he says he will fight on into the next phase of GOP primaries and caucuses.
Romney still generates the most arduous and fanatical love from those conservatives who say outright that neither McCain nor Huckabee are bona fide conservatives. John McCain’s ascendancy to front-runner status infuriates many of the most vocal personalities on the Right, such as Rush Limbaugh, James Dobson, Sean Hannity, Ann Coulter and Glenn Beck. A normally staid, polite affair of friendly words among fellow Republicans, these most boisterous of the pundits and savants on the Right have turned up the volume on the conversation within the GOP. McCain, says Limbaugh, might as well be a Democrat. Coulter has openly threatened to vote for Hillary Clinton if McCain is the eventual nominee. And for some conservatives in the GOP, Mike Huckabee, despite his staunch positions against abortion and same sex marriage, is nothing more than an imposter when it comes to taxes, government spending, and criminal justice.
So how did the voters impact the GOP results on Super Tuesday? As expected, Romney did well in Massachusetts, Utah, Colorado, and North Dakota. He also won comfortably in Alaska. Romney split Minnesota more-or-less evenly with Mike Huckabee. Romney also did well in some urban and suburban areas that are home to more the traditional brand of fiscal conservatives within the GOP—including Atlanta, Nashville and Kansas City.
Huckabee performed well in many of parts of the Deep South where religion and social conservatism may have played a key role, but he also made deep penetrations in other parts of the country, picking up counties in areas as diverse as Minnesota, Montana and Oklahoma. But Huckabee was shut out in California, New York and Arizona. And his scant few county victories in Illinois provide, perhaps, a clearer indication of his limited ability to attract independents, moderates and swing voters.
McCain, on the other hand, scored a virtual sweep of these same big states, clobbering his GOP competitors in New York, New Jersey and Illinois, and coming within striking distance of sweeping California as well. McCain also pulled off a surprisingly strong showing in western Massachusetts—Romney turf, to be sure. Coupled with his sweeps of Connecticut and Delaware, along with the substantial number of county wins in parts of Oklahoma, Alabama, Georgia and Missouri, McCain may have put enough distance between himself and Romney to make it difficult—if not impossible—for Romney to reclaim the title of front runner. Romney may be willing to continue to spend money to keep his candidacy afloat, but some observers question the wisdom and logic of Romney pressing on despite the now long odds. Still, the former Massachusetts governor vows to continue, citing the dozens of states and caucuses still on the near horizon.
But Huckabee’s persistent viability means votes may continue to hemorrhage away from Romney and into Huckabee’s third column. This flow has a double effect—putting Romney in immediate danger while also providing protection on McCain’s right flank. Indeed, in televised debates and on the campaign trail, Huckabee has become a sort of Anti-Romney—providing an affable, good-natured, self-effacing foil to Romney the slick, big-spending, Stepford candidate. And though there is little chance now that the former Arkansas governor can continue to win—all polling indications seem to show he has peaked—he intends to stay in the race, and there is little reason to expect him to step aside now that he has developed such a compelling niche among voters.
So Mitt Romney, to the intense consternation of his most vocal supporters on the right, may be operating on borrowed time—and expensive time, at that. McCain, on the other hand, seems close to being able to safely claim victory. Only Ron Paul remains to provide a radically differing brand of conservatism within the field of the four candidates left standing after Florida. Paul picked up a handful of counties in the far west—most notably in the Montana caucuses—and his substantial fundraising continues to keep him active and viable. But many observers question whether his candidacy serves any real point other than to protest the fiscal timidity and dumbed-down homogenization of the mainstream Republicans. Even where Paul wins he produces negligible real world rewards. His strong second place showing in Montana, for example, amounted to little more than bragging rights—Montana’s winner-take-all system awarded Romney all 25 delegates.
For McCain, Super Tuesday was a shining moment of vindication and renewal. His wins were very nearly national in scope, cutting across geography and demography. And his huge success in the largest of the Tuesday states gives him the edge in terms of those looking through the glass toward November. Ask yourself the same rhetorical question that Hillary Clinton asks wavering Democrats—who do you think will perform better in the general election?—and McCain starts to look very attractive indeed to Republicans worried about a resurgent Democratic Party. McCain swept New York, New Jersey and Illinois and California, losing only six counties between the four biggest Super Tuesday states. Even in evangelical conservative country, McCain managed to win significant swaths of south Alabama, south Georgia, western Oklahoma and upper Missouri—areas thought even recently to be the more natural turf of Huckabee or Fred Thompson.
The Arizona Senator won in California by hefty 42% to Romney’s 34% and Huckabee’s 12%, losing only Shasta, Sierra and Fresno counties to Romney. McCain carried New York by 51% to Romney’s 28%, a margin approaching two-to-one, and a percentage that held firm through almost the entire state. Not surprisingly McCain’s margin in New York City—Staten Island, Brooklyn, Queens, Nassau and Westchester—was even wider. In Manhattan McCain pulled in 59%, burying Romney by nearly 3-to-1. But New York offered no real surprises for the GOP, and McCain’s lopsided wins in the Empire State and the Golden State may only add fuel to the fire growing on the Right. Some conservative radio pundits began putting a fine point on the issue even as the polls started closing and the results rolled in: McCain’s big wins in these two sanctuaries of liberalism simply proves he is not one of us.
At the end of the day John McCain—whose candidacy was all but declared dead in the water just four months ago—puts a significant number of delegates under his belt and establishes himself as the front runner. Back on top of the GOP pyramid, McCain will likely begin to see cash and endorsements flow his way from those givers who may have been reluctant to back a horse—any horse. Volunteers and supporters adrift from the camps of Rudy Giuliani, Fred Thompson and others may begin to coalesce behind McCain. And after 18 months of hand-wringing anxiety over the direction of the war in Iraq, McCain seems both prescient and positively presidential for having bravely held his ground in support of the Surge—a war strategy that appears to be succeeding.
Mitt Romney now faces the gritty challenge of basic survival. Like Clinton, his campaign had no Plan B. Despite a surge of spending on advertising in key Super Tuesday markets, and despite an impressive debate performance last week in California, Romney was unable to halt McCain’s renewed momentum. Romney has precious little time to regain the high ground and find a way to halt McCain’s ascendancy.
And although it may prove still too early to predict such things, with Romney’s campaign deflating, it may be only a matter of weeks before McCain finds himself the undisputed front runner, much to the consternation of some of the GOP’s most boisterous conservative voices.
R O A D S H O W is copyright Thursday Review, 2008. Correspondence should be addressed t: alanclanton@aol.com and/or alanclanton@graceba.net
As I have indicated in previous editions of Road Show, this is a year of maximum opportunity for the Democratic Party. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama each enjoy a comfortable lead over the best competitive scenario for Republicans (which at the moment is a theoretical McCain versus Clinton match-up), but the potential advantage for Democrats stretches deeply into many other areas—U.S. Senate and House races, and numerous gubernatorial contests.
As a long time partisan Republican (close readers and close friends know my predisposition; it dates back to my childhood) I view the glass as half empty, not half full. Forgetting for the moment an unpopular incumbent President and an even more unpopular VP, Republicans have largely drifted off message and away from the cultural center. Whether it has been the scandals of Jack Abramoff or the inappropriate behavior of Mark Foley (just to name two examples), the GOP has seen a dramatic erosion of moral and political capital. Younger voters are increasingly identifying themselves as Democratic, and the high stakes, high profile battle between Clinton and Obama has driven Democratic voter registration in many states to set new records.
Much still depends on the super-heated divisions—real or perceived—within the Democratic Party, a party with a modern historical pattern of sometimes blundering into defeat despite great opportunity.
Still, Republicans face an uphill battle in the fall, with the likely outcome of a big loss across the board. At least eight states crucial to the GOP’s electoral tem-plate are now at risk, including North Carolina, Virginia, Ohio, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Pennsylvania. Some analysts even suggest that Florida could be at risk. The loss of a few of these states could dangerously alter the electoral math, and the loss of all eight in November would be catastrophic.
With the Republican contest still not coming into complete focus, and with so much strident and acrimonious shouting from the several GOP factions, there is the genuine possibility that Republicans may be facing a template-changing event this November. Even assuming that McCain does succeed at gaining the nomination with a minimum of bloodshed over March and April, the more vocal elements of the Right may find themselves without a spiritual leader, and perhaps more so if McCain chooses his running mate from among his widely-discussed short-list: Mike Huckabee, Charlie Crist, Rudy Giuliani, to name just three of the examples being given lukewarm reviews by the vocal Right. McCain has no Jack Kemp—a conservative with the sort of impeccable right-of-center resume pleasing to the right wing bloggers and radio talk show claque. Even Fred Thompson seems an unlikely choice given his age—McCain will surely seek demographic balance by choosing someone substantially younger. There is no Dream Ticket.
Further, the prism through which many Republicans view the world—and probably most traditional conservatives—seems outdated and ineffective. Lacking the intellectual guidance of a William F. Buckley or the leadership dynamic of a Ronald Reagan, the party seems adrift, lacking a core set of values and ideas that resonate across the political spectrum.
The result may be for the GOP what the Democrats faced in 1980—a sweeping defeat, and the sort of Election Day calamity that produces anti-coattails: Republicans may get dragged into painful losses in Senate and House races as well as in local elections.
There is some happy news: historically these early polling gaps often close as the voting populace size up the realities after the conventions close; shopping from among intra-party choices differs greatly from the level-playing field we experience after Labor Day. The outcome of the Obama versus Clinton battle may produce a letdown, and McCain may soon have the luxury of campaigning as the presumptive nominee, where Obama and Clinton must continue to slug it out in what has now become battle of the chainsaws. Further, the potential inability of Democrats to decompress and find unity by the convention would be the greatest gift the GOP could receive this year.
But this is tactical and reactive. Republicans cannot simply sit back with a wait-and-see attitude, hoping to exploit the typical disunity among the Democrats.
Republicans must find their theme—the words and music that again ring clear and true across a wide range of the American experience. And they must find a way to speak to a newer generation of voters which finds itself easily swayed by Obama’s message.
Republicans may find themselves wandering the wilderness soon, and that could also turn out to be a good thing for the GOP in the long view. The Republican Party found its way back from near-obscurity even after the debacle of Watergate, moving from lost cause to majority party within only about five years, but not without the guidance and steady hand of people like Ronald Reagan. Perhaps the quest for that kind of leader has begun anew.
