The tipping point had finally arrived, and Rick Santorum could no longer contend with the multiple complexities and challenges facing his insurgent campaign: a lack of incoming cash, a lack of time, and few remaining mathematical options to play out. So, after a long Easter weekend with his family--and focusing attention on his youngest daughter Bella who had been hospitalized for several days--the former Pennsylvania senator conceded that he could no longer compete in any further primary or caucus contests for the Republican nomination.
For Mitt Romney, this development essentially closes the deal and makes him the nominee- apparent. All that is left is the coronation.
Though he is still far from the required 1144 delegates needed to claim the GOP nomination in Tampa this August, Romney now faces virtually no obstacles along what remains of the open road ahead. Romney had been outspending Santorum in Pennsylvania, and over the course of the last ten days Santorum's once healthy 19-point lead in his home state had begun to evaporate, closing to with just a few points in several of the most watched polls.
A loss in the Keystone State would have devastating, but even a narrow victory might have felt like a serious defeat, with dire consequences for his hopes in the other once-promising states of Texas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Arkansas. Santorum had carried the fight as far as it could be carried.
For many political watchers, the game was already over the week earlier. Indeed, by the lights of many in the GOP establishment, Mitt Romney's April 3 trifecta win in Maryland, the District of Columbia and Wisconsin had effectively deprived Santorum of any viable options with the delegate arithmetic. In truth, neither D.C. nor Maryland offered surprises. Maryland is a moderate-to-liberal state with few Republicans, and among those in the Old Line State who count themselves among the GOP faithful, scant few can compare themselves fairly to the conservatives found in traditional GOP stronghold states. Romney carried Maryland by a comfortable margin; 49% to Santorum's 29%, with Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul trailing in the distance. Santorum won only two counties: Garrett at the western end of the state, and Somerset County on Chesapeake Bay and the border with Virginia on the Delmarva Peninsula. Two of Romney's biggest wins of the night were in Baltimore and Annapolis (Anne Arundel County) where he buried Santorum nearly two-to-one. In Montgomery County, Mitt Romney won by a staggering 60%: the governor pulled in 10,000 more votes than Santorum out of the roughly 27,000 total votes cast.
Nor was the District a shock. D.C. has about as many Republicans as can fit into an average high school gymnasium, and even if every last one of them showed up there would still be enough room for shuffleboard. In total, about 4100 voters participated in the D.C. primary, and Romney scored a lopsided 70% win.
So that left only Wisconsin in play: the Big Kahuna of the night, and the one state where Santorum was deemed to have a fair-to-middling shot at a victory. Earlier in the season, Wisconsin was seen as being not only up for grabs, but perhaps well in line with Santorum's penchant for rural and semi-rural states. Santorum has scored astonishingly well in the Midwest and Great Plains, even in states perceived as having a moderate-to-liberal tilt--Colorado, Minnesota, the Dakotas.
Santorum's wins in Iowa, Missouri and Kansas seemed--at least from the perspectives of February and March--to set the template for the anti-Romney land. So for the Santorum camp, Wisconsin had always held promise.
But in the end, Santorum's loss in Illinois was seen as an indication, perhaps, that the former Senator was no longer channeling all of the insurrectionist energy his way, and a sign that Romney had at last gained partial favor with those GOP voters who describe themselves as conservative or very conservative. In the final six or seven days the polls in Wisconsin indicated steady (and eventually irreversible) movement away from Santorum and toward Romney. Over the weekend the movement in a few polls was so large as to make it appear to some analysts that Romney's lead had become insurmountable, and by Tuesday the major networks were saying as much. (CNN was careful not to tip its hand; it already knew from early exit polling that a big Romney win was developing).
Still, even with the strong potential of a Romney three-state win, Santorum had a chance to brag a little if Wisconsin turned to be close. Romney would have to do more than just conjure up his typical numerical advantages in the big cities and heavily populated suburban counties, which in the case of the Badger State meant Milwaukee, Kenosha and Madison. The former governor would have make inroads into the areas beyond the exurbs. And, barely, Romney was able to accomplish that very feat, winning in 27 counties statewide, including many sparsely populated counties of the sort that had been going Santorum's direction all year. Nevertheless, the county-by-county map of Wisconsin bears a striking resemblance to those primary and caucus states that have already voted this year: Santorum won the vast majority of the counties--an enormous swath of the upper and center part of the state. Santorum's wins stretched unimpeded from the Mississippi River in the west to Lake Michigan on the east, from Lake Superior in the north to the borders of Iowa and Illinois in the southwest corner. Santorum had even managed to pull off a comfortable win in Brown County (Green Bay), 44% to Romney's 37%. And Santorum won in several mid-sized markets: Marathon County (Wausau); Eau Clair; Manitowoc; La Crosse County (Onalaska).
But at the end of the night Romney had won Wisconsin 44% to Santorum's 37%, giving Romney the clear right to brag, and allowing him to walk away with 33 of the 42 delegates.
The exhausted defiance on Santorum's face as he spoke to his supporters was nearly matched in emotional amperage to the relief and joy on Romney's face. Indeed, for Romney, you could readily see his underlying thought: the worst was over. Romney wasted no time in making the pivot: he directed nearly his entire speech toward President Obama and the factors which he supposes will matter in the general election. The President and his campaign team had already made the pivot themselves, and it was only a matter of hours before Obama began to name Romney in his remarks regarding the budget.
But Santorum had been underestimated all season, and it had often worked to his advantage. His spokesmen were quick to begin the spin: there are still plenty of contests ahead, and the former Senator could be expected to perform well in many of them. In fact, wins in Pennsylvania, Texas and North Carolina might easily boost Santorum from a distant second place (roughly half of Romney's delegate strength) to a place close enough perhaps to rattle the teacups at Romney's headquarters from the incoming fire. And Santorum could also be expected to do well in Kentucky and Arkansas, a part of the landscape won easily by Mike Huckabee four years before.
But then the inevitable happened: the laws of gravity and physics within the GOP finally took hold, at which point Santorum's numbers began to slide, most notably, in the Keystone State. Where he once held a commanding 19 to 20 point lead, the Pennsylvanian watched helplessly as his poll numbers sank on his home turf. For a few days it looked like a fluke, but after four days the reality of what was happening became apparent--gravitational forces within the party were back to normal. Santorum's apple was falling to earth. And though fundraising efforts were still operating at full tilt with email and direct mail campaigns, the money was decidedly not flowing in to Santorum's headquarters in Verona. Romney and his strategists, sensing that a come-from-behind win in Pennsylvania might finally drive a stake into the heart of the Santorum bandwagon, made the decision to go on the offensive. Already outspending Santorum by a wide margin, Romney was willing--according some media reports--to perhaps take the advertising expenditures to a level of five-to-one in Pennsylvania. And a heavy proportion of the Romney media blitz would be negative. Soon it became apparent that Romney, if he were able to pull off typically strong showings in the heavily populated cities and suburbs--especially Philadelphia and Pittsburg--could easily best Santorum in the Keystone State.
Meanwhile, heavy-hitter Republicans were no longer playing it safe by keeping their opinions to themselves: endorsements were already beginning to pile up in Romney's corner: Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio, to name but two.
Santorum's spokespersons announced that he would spend the long Easter weekend with family, and the rumors began to circulate.
Now Romney can complete his pivot. He no longer has Santorum (nor, by extension, Gingrich) attacking from his right flank. Romney can turn the argument toward President Obama.
The question that now seems most relevant: can Romney not only complete the pivot, but can he recover from a long, intensely scrutinized pre-season of debates, and from a grueling, contentious primary and caucus season? Can Mitt Romney make the required moves to bring his message back toward the center? And will the center listen?
Copyright 2012, Thursday Review
Road Show is published each week by Thursday Review publications, copyright 2008, 2012
